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UNDERENFRANCHISEMENT: BLACK VOTERS AND
THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS
In 1968, Hubert Humphrey secured the Democratic presidential
nomination without entering any of the fifteen primary contests held
that year.'
The notorious Chicago convention that culminated in
Humphrey's nomination revealed deep cleavages within the party over
the Vietnam War and President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs. Along with the televised havoc created by those cleavages, the
convention was dogged by suspicions that party powerbrokers simply
installed Humphrey at the top of the ticket and that his nomination
did not accurately reflect popular preference. As disastrous as that
convention may have been in the short term, however, it also spurred
the party to make long-term, fundamental reforms that devolved
power in selecting presidential nominees from party leaders to party
members. 2 Following the i968 convention, the Democratic Party required every state to amend its rules governing delegate selection in
ways that relinquished power to rank-and-file members. 3 Some states
had, of course, held presidential primaries or caucuses prior to the
1972 election, and sometimes those events actually had a discernible
impact on the presidential nomination. 4 Nonetheless, the reforms enacted in 1972 altered the very foundation of the presidential nomination process, elevating primaries and caucuses to a level of paramount
importance.
That the process is more democratic as a result of these reforms is
clear: it is now unthinkable that a presidential nominee could follow5
Humphrey's lead and altogether avoid his party's nomination events.
The increased power that voters now exert over presidential nominees
has not, however, been allocated equally among all voters. Iowa and
1 Emmett H. Buell, Jr. & James W. Davis, Win Early and Often: Candidatesand the Strategic
Environment of 1988, in NOMINATING THE PRESIDENT I, 3 (Emmett H. Buell, Jr. & Lee
Sigelman eds., i99').
2 See Arthur M. Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 214 (1984)
("[A]fter the famous I968 Democratic National Convention, numerous plaintiffs sought to convince various courts that county, state, and national parties had used unconstitutional methods of
nominating candidates or picking delegates to national nominating conventions."). Byron Shafer
has labeled these reforms a "revolutionary change in the mechanics of presidential selection," one
that "reaffirmed the goal of democratically selecting a president." BYRON E. SHAFER, QUIET
REVOLUTION:

THE STRUGGLE

FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE SHAPING OF

POST-REFORM POLITICS 4, 523 (1983).
3 See SHAFER, supra note 2, at 6.
4 See, e.g., JAMES W. DAVIS, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES: ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 3

(1980) (describing how John F. Kennedy's victory in the 196o West Virginia primary demonstrated
that the Catholic Kennedy could find support among non-Catholic voters).
5 The term "nomination events" refers to both primaries and caucuses.
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New Hampshire, which hold the first caucuses and primary of the
presidential nomination season, respectively, exert disproportionately
strong influence in selecting presidential nominees. This Note suggests
that Iowa's and New Hampshire's undue influence - coupled with
the low percentages of African Americans in those states - renders
the presidential nomination system potentially vulnerable to legal action under the results test of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as the
system provides blacks with "less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process."'6 In 2ooo, African
Americans comprised

12.3%

of the U.S. population, but just

2.1%

of

Iowa's and 0.7% of New Hampshire's.7 The negligible impact of
black voters on the presidential nomination process is particularly
stark in the Democratic Party, as blacks account for approximately
twenty percent of Democratic votes cast in recent presidential elections. 8 When one considers that Hispanics also account for about
twelve percent of the total U.S. population and extremely low percentages in Iowa and New Hampshire, 9 the discrepancy in political influence becomes all the more stark.10

6 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). The full text of section 2 reads as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
I 9 73 b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population.
Id.
7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. SUMMARY: 2000: CENSUS 2000
PROFILE 2 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. SUMMARY PROFILE]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, IOWA: 2000: CENSUS 2000 PROFILE 2 (2002) [hereinafter IOWA PROFILE];
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NEW HAMPSHIRE: 2ooo: CENSUS 2000
PROFILE 2 (2002) [hereinafter NEW HAMPSHIRE PROFILE].
8 See WILLIAM G. MAYER & ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE FRONT-LOADING PROBLEM IN
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS 162 (2004). This Note concentrates on the Democratic Party
because it is in this context that trends in African-American party identification most starkly reveal the power inequity in the presidential nomination process.
9 According to the 2000 U.S. Census, Hispanics make up 2.8% of the population in Iowa and
1.7% in New Hampshire. See IOWA PROFILE, supra note 7; NEW HAMPSHIRE PROFILE, supra
note 7.
10 Admittedly, Hispanics do not vote for Democratic candidates in the same overwhelming
percentages as do African Americans. Considering the sheer number of African Americans and
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Political scientists,1 1 journalists,1 2 and even the occasional latenight comedian1 3 have bemoaned the racially unrepresentative composition of Iowa and New Hampshire.' 4 Yet legal observers have dedicated strikingly little attention to the presidential nomination system's
racial inequities. The Supreme Court's concentration on redistricting
disputes, which in turn shapes research agendas, explains much of this
inattention. Furthermore, even the small amount of legal writing that
does concentrate on the presidential nomination system either altogether ignores the modern racial dynamic15 or misunderstands how
presidential primaries work in practice. 16 This Note seeks to shift the
Voting Rights Act's focus from local districts to the national stage,
from electing black officials to realizing equal political participation.
By emphasizing nationwide political participation, this Note illustrates how the current presidential nomination system "underenfranchises"' 17 black voters in the Democratic Party. Part I establishes the
unrivalled importance of Iowa and New Hampshire in the presidential
Hispanics who vote Democratic, however, the combined minority vote is substantial and woefully
underrepresented in the presidential nomination contests that matter most.
1 See, e.g., MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 8, at 162.
12 See, e.g., Ann Gerhart, Rebel Y'All, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2004, at Ci (describing how newspaper columnists often criticize the racially unrepresentative composition of Iowa and New
Hampshire).
13 Rob Corddry, a correspondent for The Daily Show, sarcastically addressed critics of New
Hampshire's lack of diversity given its prominent position in the presidential election: "I'd like to
point out to them [that] there are many shades of white people here .... I saw a guy with a tan
today... It's a melting pot - a creamy, creamy melting pot." "The Daily Show" Tunes Infor the
Push, UNION LEADER (Manchester, NH), Jan. 25, 2004, at Ai, LEXIS, News Library, U.S.
Newspapers File (second omission in original) (quoting Corddry) (internal quotation mark omitted).
14 The unrepresentative character of Iowa and New Hampshire extends beyond racial composition, as neither state contains a major metropolitan area. See MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 8,
at 162.
15 See, e.g., Leonard P. Stark, Note, The PresidentialPrimary and Caucus Schedule: A Role
for FederalRegulation?, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331 (1996); Michael S. Steinberg, Note, A Critique of the Current Method of Scheduling PresidentialPrimary Elections and a Discussion of
PotentialJudicial Challenges, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2001).
16 See, e.g., Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President:Minority Vote Dilution and the
Electoral College, 1o5 YALE L.J. 935, 936 (1996) ("Although [black voters] often exert considerable
influence in presidentialprimaries, their status as a racial minority ensures that, in the general
election, their voices are frequently drowned out by the majority." (emphasis added)). Hoffman
is, in theory, correct: the absence of a winner-take-all system in presidential nomination contests
should permit black voters to play an influential role in determining the Democratic nominee. As
implemented, however, the racially unrepresentative character of Iowa and New Hampshire affords black voters considerably less influence on the process than Hoffman's statement suggests.
17 This Note coins this term in part to get beyond the "vote dilution" paradigm. The term
"vote dilution" appears nowhere in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and is coherent only if one
concentrates on the instrumental (as opposed to the expressive) purpose of voting. See generally
Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663
(2001). The term "underenfranchisement" better captures the injury inflicted by the current
presidential primary, and better portends the coming battles in voting rights law.

2004]

UNDERENFRANCHISEMENT

2321

nomination process and explains how past efforts to dislodge those
states have proven ineffective. Part I further explores how the first-inthe-nation statutes in those states effectively "lockup" the presidential
nomination process, making it a plausible target for judicial intervention. Part II acknowledges that the dominant framework for intervention - the Gingles vote dilution test 8 - makes judicial action initially appear unlikely, but argues that Gingles's theoretical framework
and section 2'S core purpose support such action. Part III identifies
the harm caused by a front-loaded process that begins in racially
homogeneous states - a harm that is captured by neither the term
"vote dilution" nor the term "disenfranchisement." Employing a term
that describes the space between these two familiar concepts, Part III
labels the expressive harm in the presidential nomination context one
of "underenfranchisement."
Part IV offers a brief conclusion. By
identifying the actual injury caused by the racial inequities of Iowa's
and New Hampshire's primacy, this Note highlights more systemic
problems with the fundamentally antidemocratic nature of the current
method of presidential nomination. Rather than speculating about
potential remedies, however, this Note takes the initial step of
revealing the inequitable distribution of influence in selecting
presidential nominees. In doing so, this Note seeks to spark dialogue
about the impact of race on presidential politics - a dialogue well
worth beginning as Congress reconsiders the Voting Rights Act,
currently set to expire in 2007.

I. THE STRANGLEHOLD OF IOWA AND NEW HAMPSHIRE
A. Distortionof the PresidentialCampaign
The Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary profoundly influence the selection of the nation's leader, as those two states establish
the tone for the presidential campaign. A candidate who achieves consecutive victories in these states establishes an aura of invincibility.1 9
Of the eighteen presidential nominees selected from 1972 through
2004, only two emerged from Iowa lower than second place. 20 This
trend does not imply, of course, that subsequent primaries serve merely
as an echo chamber for Iowa and New Hampshire voters' prefer-

18 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
19 See Buell & Davis, supra note i, at 6 ("Back-to-back wins in Iowa and New Hampshire can
make a front-runner seemingly unstoppable, but a defeat in either place immediately raises grave
questions about the candidate's future.").
20 See Stark, supra note 15, at 341. This Note presumes, as is nearly certain, that George W.
Bush and John Kerry will accept the nominations of their respective parties at the 2004 conventions.
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ences. 21 Indeed, New Hampshire voters not infrequently favor a dif2
ferent candidate from the one whom a plurality of Iowans supported. 1
Nonetheless, the ability to vote first in a staggered nomination system
establishes the conventional wisdom that subsequent states must either
23
confirm or reject.

Perhaps more important than Iowa's and New Hampshire's ability
to produce frontrunners is their ability to exercise what is in essence a
veto over the presidential bids of some candidates. As Washington
Post columnist David Broder contends, "what happens in Iowa and
New Hampshire is more than conversation; it's an elimination contest."'24 This veto power is arguably most pronounced with respect to
those candidates who hail from the Midwest and perform poorly in
Iowa or those who hail from the Northeast and perform poorly in New
Hampshire. In the quest for the 2004 Democratic nomination, for instance, despite having secured impressive labor endorsements and having previously run a credible presidential bid, U.S. Representative
Richard Gephardt of Missouri felt compelled to exit the campaign afIowa demonstrated only lukewarm supter the voters of neighboring
25
port for his candidacy.
In addition to this veto power, Iowa's and New Hampshire's primacy in the nomination system distorts the content of the debate
among presidential hopefuls. The racial homogeneity of the earlyvoting states, along with their lack of a major metropolitan area, establishes a domestic agenda that often overlooks issues that strongly
affect African Americans. Although candidates are all but forced to
support family farm subsidies as a sop to Iowans and to support various pork projects for New Hampshirites, black voters have few opportunities to extract similar commitments. 26 As a result of the agendasetting function of Iowa and New Hampshire, candidates pay minimal
21 It is worth remembering, after all, that U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie emerged victorious
from the I972 Iowa caucuses and yet did not secure the Democratic nomination. See SHAFER,
supra note 2, at 3.
22 A candidate need not necessarily win either of those states to become the frontrunner, as the
media and donors calibrate their electoral expectations according to the geographic proximity of
the candidate's home state to Iowa or New Hampshire.
23 It seems possible to develop a mathematical model to determine how the value of a vote
decreases with each successive stage of the presidential nomination process. Cf.John F. Banzhaf
III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV.
304, 3o6 (1968) (contending that "the current Electoral College system falls short of even an approximation of equality in voting power" because "a voter in New York State has 3.312 times the
voting power of a citizen in another part of the country").
24 David S. Broder, Iowa Hogs the Politics, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2ooo, at B7.
25 See Lois Romano, Gephardt Ends Bidfor White House, WASH. POST, Jan. 2i, 2004, at A5.
26 One could imagine Democratic candidates courting black voters by, for example, decrying
mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug offenders, or by promising to earmark funds
for urban locales in an effort to enact a domestic Marshall Plan.
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attention at the outset of their campaigns to issues that particularly affect black citizens. 27 Even presidential candidates setting out to make
race a principal issue can effectively be silenced on racial matters by
the overwhelmingly white early-voting electorate. For example, when
U.S. Senator Bill Bradley announced his presidential candidacy in
1998, he trumpeted the central role that race would play in his campaign.2 8 During the ensuing campaign season, however, Bradley dedicated little time to addressing racial issues, presumably because doing
so would not have appealed to many voters in Iowa and New Hampshire. 29
B. Iowa's and New Hampshire's Struggle To Maintain Primacy
Iowa and New Hampshire have maintained their primacy not because other states willingly defer, but because their legislatures have
passed statutes requiring them to kick off the caucus and primary season. 30 When other states have attempted to displace them, the pair
have tenaciously (and successfully) fended off competitors by wielding
the influence garnered by their traditional first-in-the-nation status,
which allows them to lure major candidates away from interloping
states 3' and to monopolize media coverage.
Political scientist Emmett Buell has ably detailed the most rancorous of these challenges, which occurred in the period leading up to the

27 This lack of Democratic attention to African Americans is all the more striking because it
contravenes the conventional wisdom that candidates play to the party's base during the nomination season and move toward the center during the general election.
28 See Francis X. Clines, Bradley Is Rested and Raring for Biggest of Games: Presidential
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, i998, at 40 (describing Bradley's commitment to addressing racial divisions).
29 See MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 8, at 163 ("The principal reason [Bradley] did not talk
much about race was that he did so much of his early campaigning in Iowa and New Hampshire,
two states with almost no black residents.").
30 IOWA CODE ANN. § 43.4 (West 1999) ("The date [of the caucuses] shall be at least eight
days earlier than the scheduled date for any meeting, caucus or primary which constitutes the first
determining stage of the presidential nominating process in any other state .... "); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 653:9 (Michie 1996) ("The presidential primary election shall be held on the second
Tuesday in March or on the Tuesday at least 7 days immediately preceding the date on which any
other state shall hold a similar election, whichever is earlier . . ").
31 New Hampshire's power over candidates is vividly illustrated by Senator Joseph Lieberman's reversal on the subject of primary reform after he entered the national political scene. In
October 1999, just months before being tapped as Al Gore's running mate, Lieberman cosponsored legislation in the Senate designed "[t]o provide for a rotating schedule for regional selection
of delegates to a national Presidential nominating convention." Regional Presidential Selection
Act of 1999, S. 1789, io6th Cong. (1999). After entering the race for the 2004 presidential nomination, though, Lieberman vowed not to challenge either Iowa's or New Hampshire's first-in-thenation status. See Thomas Beaumont, Keep Iowa, N.H. First, 6 Candidates Request, DES
MOINES REG., Jan. 28, 2004, at A 4 , 2004 WL 60230788.
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1984 presidential campaign.3 2 When the national Democratic Party
announced in early i983 that it intended to schedule New Hampshire's

primary on the same day as Vermont's, New Hampshire's elected officials charged that this plan violated state law and threatened state tradition.3 3 Forming a coalition, 34 New Hampshire and Iowa risked
party sanctions to hold their events first and thus avoid sharing the political spotlight with other states. After the two states announced that
they intended to override the national party's schedule, presidential
candidates not surprisingly - proved unwilling to alienate voters
in these crucial states for the sake of abiding by party rules. 35 In its
staring contest with Iowa and New Hampshire, the Democratic Party
blinked first and sanctioned neither the states nor their delegates to the
1988 convention. Buell concludes his analysis with a pessimistic prediction that, regrettably, has proved all too prescient: "Regardless of
what [nomination] process evolves, . . . Iowa and New Hampshire will
'36
probably do all in their power to remain first-in-the-nation.
Advocates of Iowa's and New Hampshire's primacy typically cite
three principal benefits of the current order. First, advocates of the
current system stress the value of having candidates compete in states
with relatively small populations, where politicians are forced to engage in "retail politics" by providing voters with an opportunity to
take the measure of the candidates. Having a highly populated state
like New York or California host the initial events, advocates argue,
would deny voters a chance to look candidates in the eye, as presidential nomination contests would largely degenerate into media wars.
Second, advocates claim that the small populations of the initial states
afford nonfrontrunner candidates a meaningful opportunity to win the
nomination even if they have not amassed a sizable war chest. The
thinking here is that long-shot candidates would be longer-shots still if
frontrunners had the luxury of saturating major media markets with
commercials. Third, rather than viewing the repeat-player status of
Iowa and New Hampshire as a liability, advocates of the current system extol the value of tradition, 37 contending that the attention candidates lavish on voters every election cycle results in an unusually sophisticated and savvy electorate.
If less informed citizens sifted

32 See Emmett H. Buell, Jr., First-in-the-Nation:Disputes over the Timing of Early Democratic PresidentialPrimaries and Caucuses in 1984 and 1988, 4 J.L. & POL. 3 11, 317-39 (1987).
33 See id. at 339.
34 Maine was also a part of the coalition because it sought to hold its caucuses on a day that
fell outside of the window approved by the national Democratic Party. See id. at 326.
35 See id. at 327-28.
36 Id. at 342.
37 New Hampshire has held the first presidential primary since 192O; Iowa has held the first
caucuses of any consequence since 1972. MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 8, at 16o.
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through the candidates, advocates contend, the surviving candidates
may not be as qualified.
These justifications for the current nomination system prove too
much. Neither of the first two arguments for the status quo is specific
to Iowa and New Hampshire; indeed, both arguments would be applicable to any state that has a relatively small population. Although it is
true that no state provides a perfect microcosm of the United States,
several other states have the benefit of a small population without being racially homogeneous. 38 Similarly, the argument that Iowans and
New Hampshirites are unusually sophisticated and savvy voters - in
addition to perhaps being racially coded - fails to prove that other
voters would be incapable of fulfilling such a role. If voters in Iowa
and New Hampshire are more sophisticated, they are so by virtue of
the experience of having presidential candidates quadrennially lavish
attention on them. At best, this is an argument for the value of primacy in general, not for the primacy of New Hampshire and Iowa in
particular. Indeed, other states should be permitted to partake in the
civic invigoration that accompanies primacy in the presidential nomination process, an invigoration that is currently reserved exclusively
for the citizens of two sparsely populated, racially unrepresentative
states.
C. Lockup: The Case for JudicialIntervention
Reform of the presidential nomination system would preferably
come directly from the national Democratic Party or through the political process. In the past, however, such efforts have proven unsuccessful. Following the i984 confrontation noted above, for instance,
Iowa and New Hampshire secured an agreement from the national
Democratic Party enabling those states to hold their nomination events
first, without interference from other states. 39 As the 1988 election
year approached, however, Minnesota and South Dakota attempted to
circumvent the agreement, scheduling their primaries to coincide with
New Hampshire's intended date. 40 After the national Democratic

38 Iowa's total population (2.9 million) is much larger than Delaware's (783,60o) and comparable to Connecticut's (3-4 million) and South Carolina's (4.0 million). In contrast to Iowa's low
percentage of African Americans (2%), however, these other states have significantly higher percentages: Delaware (i9%), Connecticut (9%), and South Carolina (29%). IOWA PROFILE, supra
note 7, at 2; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONNECTICUT'. 2000:
CENSUS

2000 PROFILE 2 (2002);

U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU,

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

DELAWARE: 200o: CENSUS 2000 PROFILE 2 (2002); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SOUTH CAROLINA: 2000: CENSUS 2000 PROFILE 2 (2002).

39 See Buell & Davis, supra note i, at 5.
40 See id.
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Party proved unable to convince the would-be interlopers 4 to
abandon
1
the date, New Hampshire moved its primary up one week.
More recently, the 1996 presidential campaign presented significant
threats to the primacy of Iowa and New Hampshire, but both states
emerged with their first-in-the-nation status intact. Even though
Alaska and Louisiana held their Republican caucuses before Iowa's,
the media continued to regard the old stalwart as the first significant
voting indicator of the presidential nomination process, 42 thereby curtailing the influence of the Alaska and Louisiana caucuses on the electorate. On the primary front, meanwhile, when Delaware scheduled
its 1996 primary to fall only four days after New Hampshire's, the
Granite State's governor charged that Delaware's lack of deference
represented nothing less than an "attack on the people of New Hamp43
shire and the tradition of the political primary system in this nation."
In addition to affecting these histrionics, New Hampshire convinced
most of the presidential candidates to skip Delaware's primary alto44
gether.
Given the inefficacy of these self-help and congressional reform efforts, judicial intervention may well be the most promising alternative.
Although the Court has long expressed reluctance about entering what
Justice Frankfurter famously dubbed the "political thicket," 4 5 it has
historically been willing to intervene when two conditions are met:
when intervention is necessary to correct deprivations of political
power that cut along racial lines and when the political market malfunctions. The current presidential nomination system presents an instance in which these two considerations converge, making the prospect of judicial intervention promising.
Of particular importance here is the current system's antidemocratic elements, a glaring example of which is the severely limited in41 See id. This shift prompted Iowa, too, to reschedule its primary so that it could, consistent
with its statute, hold its caucuses eight days before any other nominating event. See id.
42 RHODES COOK, THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PROCESS: A PLACE FOR US? 95

(describing how the media largely failed to take notice of the caucuses that preceded
Iowa's). Buell and Davis describe a similar phenomenon that occurred during the 1988 GOP caucuses: "Even though Republican caucuses in Michigan, Hawaii, and Kansas preceded those in
Iowa (the Michigan process began in August 1986), the news media clearly regarded Iowa's precinct caucuses as the first real test of the 1988 nominating process." Buell & Davis, supra note i,
at 5.
43 Richard L. Berke, Arizona Moves Up Its Primary To Catch Political Limelight, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995, at Aio (internal quotation mark omitted).
44 Id. Although most presidential candidates did not actively campaign in Delaware, the ballot in that state nonetheless included the names of all candidates who received federal matching
funds. Still, New Hampshire construed Delaware's primary as insufficiently "similar" to its own
later primary and therefore could avoid rescheduling without contravening its own statute. See
id.
45 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion).
(2004)
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fluence of black voters in selecting presidential nominees. Despite
constituting a substantial portion of the national population, black
voters are severely underrepresented in the state electorates that exert
the most influence on presidential nominations. Moreover, having input on the Democratic nominee is the most vital part of the process for
African Americans, as they are likely to vote for the Democratic nominee in large numbers, regardless of who he or she is.46 This uneven influence is problematic not only from the standpoint of participatory
democracy, 47 but also from the standpoint of influence - that is, the
current nomination system deprives blacks and other racial minorities
of a substantial voice in the selection of the Democratic nominee and
impairs their ability to shape the nominee's agenda.
Viewed through the lens of the marketplace - a form of analysis
championed by Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes 48 Iowa and New Hampshire have essentially monopolized the most important aspects of the presidential nomination process. Building on
the process-based theories of Professor John Hart Ely,4 9 Issacharoff
and Pildes argue that it is appropriate to view "democratic politics as
akin in important respects to a robustly competitive market - a market whose vitality depends on both clear rules of engagement and on
the ritual cleansing born of competition.150 Although buying into the
market metaphor wholesale makes for an impoverished view of democracy,5 ' Issacharoff and Pildes accurately note that the judiciary is
most willing to intervene to combat anticompetitive political structures. The state statutes that confer first-in-the-nation status on Iowa
and New Hampshire should be viewed by the judiciary as impermissibly locking up the presidential nomination system. Given the racial
composition of these states, their monopolization of the system essentially ignores the votes of the black electorate.
46

See supra p.

2319.

47 Cf. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 265 (2002) (explaining the importance of ensuring that racial minorities have "the opportunity to participate in
the self-governing democracy that the Constitution creates"); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term-Comment: [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, io8 HARV. L. REV. 109,
125 (1994) (explaining that "[g]roup participation in political life is consistent with fundamental
democratic principles").
48 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (arguing that insights from the marketplace can be
usefully imported to illuminate democratic politics).
49 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
117 (1980) ("[U]nblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage.").
50 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 48, at 646.
51 For a thoughtful critique of Issacharoff and Pildes that argues that the value of the market
metaphor can be overstated, see Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697
0x999).
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The archetypal instances of judicial intervention in the context of
market failure, according to Issacharoff and Pildes, arose in the disputes known as the White Primary Cases.5 2 In these cases, which
originated in Texas, the Supreme Court invalidated a series of increasingly elaborate schemes designed to prevent blacks from casting ballots
in the primary contests that, for all practical purposes, determined the
winner of the general election. In Terry v. Adams,5 3 the last of the
White Primary Cases, the Court noted that "no election machinery
could be sustained if its purpose or effect was to deny Negroes on account of their race an effective voice in the governmental affairs of
their country, state, or community."5 4 The Democratic primary and
the general election, the Court reasoned, were "no more than the perfunctory ratifiers" of the choices made during the white primaries.5 5
This perfunctory ratification left blacks with "an empty vote cast after
the real decisions [were] made. '5 6 Issacharoff and Pildes contend that
the White Primary Cases have become "untouchable icons in the legal
world." s7 Given the iconic status of those cases, it is odd that many
citizens remain unaware of the problems that currently diminish black
input in the presidential nomination process. The theme sounded in
Terry - focusing on "voice" and influence in addition to the mere casting of ballots - has been echoed in more recent Supreme Court decisions.5 8 Yet the modern presidential nomination system effectively
mutes the voices of black voters, severely limiting their participation in
the political process.
Consequently, the lockup that Issacharoff and Pildes identify in the
White Primary Cases persists today, albeit in an admittedly less overt
form. To be sure, unlike in Texas during the White Primary era, the
52 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (953);

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v.

Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
53 345 U.S. at 461.
54 Id. at 466 (plurality opinion). Justice Black's controlling opinion in Terry spoke for an unusually fractured Court, and both Justice Frankfurter and Justice Clark wrote concurring opinions that focused on locating a conceptual peg on which to base a finding that the Jaybird primary constituted state action. See id. at 470-77 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); id. at 477-84 (Clark,
J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Minton argued that the Jaybirds's actions made them merely
an unusually effective interest group and could not properly be conceived of as state action. Id. at
484-94 (Minton, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 469 (plurality opinion).
56 Id. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring).
57 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 48, at 652. See generally Ellen D. Katz, Resurrecting the
White Primary, 152 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (critiquing recent efforts to claim the mantle
of the White Primary Cases by supporters of defeated Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney).
58 See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2003) (trumpeting the importance of
"influence" in electoral districts); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 1O9, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion)
("[T]he power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections."); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (focusing on the voters' duty "to pull, haul, and trade
to find common political ground").
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Democratic Party today faces intense competitive pressure from the
Republican Party to produce a viable candidate for the general election. These competetive pressures are ineffective, however, as Iowa
and New Hampshire play the Democratic and Republican parties off
of each other by arguing that whichever party challenges the order of
nomination events will lose susbequent elections. Just as Texas once
prevented Negroes from casting meaningful ballots in its elections,
Iowa's and New Hampshire's stranglehold on the presidential nomination system prevents the overwhelming majority of African Americans
from casting ballots at the most meaningful stage of the process. In
sum, the absolutely all-white primary of yesteryear has metamorphosed into the nearly all-white primary of today.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2 TO THE NATIONAL
NOMINATION SYSTEM

Section 2 provides that members of protected groups must not
"have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process. '59 Before addressing the substantive provisions of section 2, it is essential to establish how the Democratic National Committee's actions might be construed to fulfill section 2's
state action requirement. 60 The Court has never specifically addressed
whether conduct of the national parties constitutes state action under
the Voting Rights Act or the Reconstruction Amendments. Indeed, the
Court has twice explicitly reserved judgment on this issue. 6 1 Nonetheless, if the Court is willing to view a state Republican Party as a state
actor, as it has done recently, 62 it follows that the national Democratic
Party - which can plausibly be viewed as an aggregation of the state
parties - could be conceived of as a state actor. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit deployed this transitive reasoning in Bode
59 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).

60 Alternatively, one could argue that section 2 applies directly to Iowa's and New Hampshire's primacy statutes. First, Iowa and New Hampshire, acting through their legislatures in
adopting these statutes and through their executives in enforcing them, have clearly engaged in
state action. Second, section 2 outlaws the abridgment of the right to vote "of any citizen of the
United States." Id. The statute thus seems to contemplate the possibility of a state abridging the
voting rights of another state's residents rather than the rights of its own residents.
61 See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 483 n.4 (1975) (leaving open the question "whether the
decisions of a national political party in the area of delegate selection constitute state or governmental action"); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1972) (per curiam) (expressing reservation
about intervening in the internal affairs of political parties). To be sure, judicial intervention in
the presidential nomination process would need to grapple with the freedom of association protections of the First Amendment that the Court sometimes extends to political parties. Such concerns, however, extend beyond the scope of this Note. Suffice it to say for present purposes that it
is far from clear that courts would find that the First Amendment rights trump the countervailing
interests at stake.
62 See Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186 (1996) (plurality opinion).
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v. National Democratic Party63 by holding that "if the action of the in-

dividual state parties in selecting delegates to participate in the presidential-nominating process constitutes state action, the collective activity of all the states' delegates at the national convention can be no less
readily classified as state action. '64 Indeed, pressure from the Iowa
and New Hampshire state parties exerts a strong influence over the
65
national parties' ordering of presidential nomination events.

Aside from having the Democratic National Committee satisfy the
state action requirement, an additional hurdle stands in the way of applying section

2

analysis to the nomination system.

decades, the Court's section

2

Over the last two

analysis has strayed from multifarious

applications and become increasingly synonymous with the three-

pronged test for determining vote dilution that the Court announced in
Thornburg v. Gingles.66 The Gingles test is a set of three mechanically

applied factors for determining whether cognizable vote dilution has
occurred in a multimember district. First, plaintiffs charging vote di-

lution must form a racial minority group that "is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member

district. '6 7 Second, the racial minority in question must demonstrate
"that it is politically cohesive. '68 Third, the racial minority must show
"that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it. . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." 69 The
Gingles test, therefore, premises the finding of harm on the availability
of a remedy, which has traditionally been defined as the possibility of
creating a single majority-minority district.
The Gingles test provided some much-needed clarity to lower
courts, which had previously employed the nebulous "totality of the

circumstances" test in section

2

cases. 70

Indeed, the factors have

63 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
64 Id. at 1304 (quoting Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1275 (D.C. Cir.
'97')).
65 See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, D.C.'s Early Primary Attracts Its First Voters, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2003, at Bi ("At the demand of Democrats in Iowa and New Hampshire, the national party
has refused to sanction any official effort to preempt those states' first-in-the-nation caucus and
primary, Jan. 19 and Jan. 27, respectively.").
66 478 U.S. 3o (1986).
67 Id. at 5o.
68 Id. at 5 1.
69 Id.
70 See Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right ifHe Had Said: "When It
Comes to Redistricting,Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237,
1240 (1993) (commending the Gingles evidentiary standard as "straightforward" compared to its
predecessor); Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for JudicialReview of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1681 (1993) (praising Gingles for providing lower courts
"with a finite and easily defined universe of justiciable minority vote dilution claims"). But cf
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003) (measuring vote dilution in reference to a baseline of
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proven so magnetic that it has become unusual to bring section 2
claims that fall outside the scope of Gingles.71 This trend is problematic because Gingles's "geographic compactness" requirement, which
has evoked the ire of critics as applied even to local districts,7 2 is absolutely meaningless in the context of the nationwide presidential election. It is crucial to remember, however, that section 2 as amended in
1982 was designed to address (and has invalidated) a range of political
practices that extend well beyond vote dilution and redistricting
claims.
The inapplicability of the specific factors outlined in Gingles should
not be taken to mean that the opinion - or the Voting Rights Act generally - offers no grounds for toppling Iowa's and New Hampshire's
primacy. Rather than fixating exclusively on the multimember district
context of Gingles, courts should focus on the theoretical framework
that animated the opinion. In both the majority opinion and his own
separate opinion, Justice Brennan counselled that section 2 requires a
"functional" approach. 73 Adopting a functional approach in the presidential nomination context would require jettisoning the "geographic
compactness" component, focusing instead on the textual core of section 2: equal participation in the political process. 74 Gingles located an
injury by determining the circumstances under which a majorityminority district can be drawn. But vote dilution is not the injury at

legislative influence); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (i994) (reannouncing the totality
of the circumstances test in section 2 analysis).
71 See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 343 (I999) (labeling the Gingles test
"the fulcrum of voting rights cases").
72 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 174 (1989) ("The courts often
focus on geography as if it were more than a means of providing representation, and they ignore
effective access to the political process."); see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 127-29 (I994)
(arguing that geographically based representation - though deeply rooted in history - will not
accurately reflect the preferences of all voters within that district).
73 See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15 ("Under a 'functional' view of the political process
mandated by § 2 ....
); id. at 66 (opinion of Brennan, J.) ("A test for racially polarized voting that
denies the fact that race and socioeconomic characteristics are often closely correlated permits
neither a practical evaluation of reality nor a functional analysis of vote dilution."); id. at 73 ("All
that matters under § 2 and under a functional theory of vote dilution is voter behavior, not its explanations.").
The functional approach in voting rights cases - if not the terminology - stretches at least
as far back as Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Writing for himself and two other Justices,
Justice Black adopted the functional view in finding that the Jaybird primary satisfied the state
action requirement: "When it produces the equivalent of the prohibited election, the damage has
been done." Id. at 469 (plurality opinion).
74 Although section 2's text does not contain the words "vote dilution," it does say that it is
designed to address situations that extend protected classes "less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process." 42 U.S.C. § 1 9 7 3 (b) (2ooo).
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issue in the presidential nomination system - rather, that injury is
underenfranchisement, which is analytically distinct from the injury in
Gingles but could nonetheless be construed to fit into section 2'S
framework. By looking beyond the descriptively representative goal of
electing minority officials 7s and instead taking a cue from the Court's
recent emphasis on electoral influence, 76 courts could interpret the Voting Rights Act as remedying a harm on the national level.
III. A NEW EXPRESSIVE HARM: THE PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATION SYSTEM AS UNDERENFRANCHISEMENT
A.

UnderenfranchisementDefined

The term "underenfranchisement" attempts to describe the space
between disenfranchisement, on the one hand, and vote dilution, on
the other. Although many scholars believe that the line between the
two concepts can be drawn cleanly, 77 historian J. Morgan Kousser contends that "disfranchisement and vote dilution are not pure concepts.
They not only merge into each other, they are complementary, each increasing the other's force ....,,7s Whereas disenfranchisement and

75 See Lani Guinier, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory - Where Do We Go from Here?, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 283,
283 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) ("The strategy of voting rights litigation,
preoccupied as it has been with creating districts in which black representatives can be elected,
has traded genuine protection of minority rights for a claim of fairness based on electing a few
minorities simply to promote an ideal of descriptive representation.").
76 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2512 (2003) ("[A] court must examine whether a
new plan adds or subtracts 'influence districts' - where minority voters may not be able to elect
a candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process."); see
also Terry, 345 U.S. at 469-70 (plurality opinion) (finding that the primary system "strip[ped] Negroes of every vestige of influence in selecting [elected] officials").
77 See, e.g., Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial
and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-199o, at 2i, 22 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)
("The distinction between disfranchisement and dilution can be made as follows. Disfranchisement prohibits or discourages a group from voting - for example, through making it difficult to
register, intimidating would-be voters from entering the polling booth, declaring ballots invalid
for specious reasons, stuffing the ballot box, or inaccurately tallying votes. Dilution, on the other
hand, can operate even when all voters have full access to the polling place and are assured that
their votes will be fairly tallied.").
78 J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 75, at
135, 174. Kousser explains:
The white primary, for instance, formally disfranchised no one. Blacks could, under its
rules, register and vote freely in the general election. What it did was to debase their
suffrage, to dilute it, by banning them from having a chance to influence the outcome in
the only election that mattered, just as at-large elections in areas with racially polarized
voting patterns do.
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vote dilution both have shortcomings in describing the current racial
voting dynamic, underenfranchisement combines the concepts behind
these two terms to describe a voting rights injury that particularly affects African Americans in the modern era. The term disenfranchisement is descriptively lacking because blacks are no longer regularly
disenfranchised on racial grounds.7 9 Although black votes continue to
be diluted, however, the Court has shown little enthusiasm for dilution
claims in recent years. In addition, the term "vote dilution" is mired in
the instrumental approach to voting, which concentrates on the tangible impact of a vote.80 The theory of underenfranchisement, in contrast, reflects an expressive and constitutive view of voting that concentrates on the more symbolic dimensions of a vote."'
Groups of voters are underenfranchised, then, when they are differentially prevented from participating in the political process,8 2 regardless of whether their votes would otherwise have had a decisive
impact on the election. Given this definition, underenfranchisement
could be applied to many troubling aspects of black suffrage, including
the disenfranchisement of felons, a disproportionate number of whom
are racial minorities.8 3 Similarly, claims challenging high rates of voting equipment malfunction could also be understood as underenfranchisement claims, as many older voting machines (which tend to mal-

Id.; see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (i96o) (Whittaker, J., concurring) (arguing
that the majority was mistaken in using the Fifteenth Amendment to strike down Tuskegee's redistricting scheme, as blacks had not actually been disenfranchised).
79 Felon disenfranchisement laws - although not explicitly racial in nature - result in a disproportionate number of members of the protected class having less opportunity to participate in
the political process. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, I15 HARV. L. REV.
1939, 1949-57 (2002) (describing various litigation challenges to felon disenfranchisement under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
80 The framework established in Gingles views black votes as being diluted only if racial bloc
voting occurs and a minority of black voters are consistently overwhelmed by a white majority.
See supra p. 2330.
81 See Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right To Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV.
491, 512-14 (2000) (distinguishing the expressive value of voting, which stems from being fully
included in the political community, from the constitutive value of voting, which stems from the
self-identification inherent in exercising the franchise).
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 1 9 7 3 (b) (2ooo) (providing that African Americans cannot "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process").
83 See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d ioo9, 1020 (9 th Cir. 2003) (holding that "racial bias
in the criminal justice system may very well interact with voter disqualifications to create the
kinds of barriers to political participation on account of race that are prohibited by Section 2").
But see Farrakhan v. Washington, No. 01-35032, 2004 WL 343523, at *2, *6 (9 th Cir. Feb. 24,
2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that "statistical disparities [are] not enough to establish vote denial under section 2" and that "extending the VRA to
reach felon disenfranchisement laws . . . seriously jeopardizes its constitutionality" (citing Smith v.
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, iog F.3d 586, 595 (9 th Cir. 1997))).
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function more frequently) can be found in poor areas with high per84
centages of racial minorities.
Applying underenfranchisement to the presidential nomination
process helps to elucidate the term. African Americans cannot be said
to be disenfranchised in the presidential nomination process, as neither
Iowa nor New Hampshire turns away black residents from the polls
on the basis of their skin color. Nonetheless, very few African Americans are eligible to cast ballots in those all-important contests - an
unfortunate circumstance that has the effect of muting black voices in
the nomination process.
Using the expressiveness of underenfranchisement rather than the instrumentality of vote dilution makes it irrelevant whether the preferences of African Americans diverge completely from or align perfectly with white preferences for particular
presidential nominees. Rather, the very fact that a disproportionately
small percentage of blacks are eligible to vote during the early, vital
stages of the presidential nomination process constitutes the underenfranchisement injury.
B. Analyzing UnderenfranchisementUnder Section 2
The current method of selecting Democratic presidential nominees
constitutes an expressive harm to African Americans. In Shaw v.
Reno 5 the Supreme Court invalidated a majority-minority district
that roughly traced the path of an interstate highway because its
boundaries betrayed what the Court viewed as the legislature's
impermissibly excessive attention to the racial composition of its districts. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated "that we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter."8' 6 Reapportionment plans that fixate on the electorate's racial
composition, she explained, and that appear to ignore traditional districting criteria such as compactness, "bear[] an uncomfortable resem-

84 Cf Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court's denial of preliminary injunction and enjoining California's gubernatorial recall election on the ground that plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits
of their claim alleging that statistical disparities in voting technology violated the Equal Protection Clause, without addressing plaintiffs' section 2 claim), rev'd en banc, 344 F.3 d 914 (9 th Cir.
2003). In reversing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit noted that although plaintiffs' section 2
claim was "stronger" than their equal protection claim, "[t]here [was] significant dispute in the
record ... as to the degree and significance of the disparity," which precluded a finding of a
F.3 d at gi8-ig. See generally Spencer
strong likelihood of success on the merits. Shelley, 3
Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469
(2001) (arguing that racial disparity in the voting context conveys an expressive harm of exclusion
that may cause democratic instability).
85 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
86 Id. at 647.
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blance to political apartheid."8' '7 Justice O'Connor warned against
such plans by further deploying charged language: "Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing
racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters." 88
Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi argue that the harms
articulated in Shaw v. Reno can be understood only as making "expressive harms" constitutionally cognizable in the reapportionment
context.8 9 Pildes and Niemi define an expressive harm as "one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the
action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as important as what the action does."90 Thus, when Justice O'Connor worried about "[t]he message that such [gerrymandered]
districting [sent]" in Shaw,91 she articulated an archetypal conception
of expressive harm.
Professors Pildes and Niemi's seminal article, in its effort to explain
the Court's jurisprudence, has in turn shaped the Court's views and
vocabulary. In the wake of Pildes and Niemi's Shaw exegesis, various
Justices have explicitly adopted the "expressive harms" approach in
voting rights cases. In Bush v. Vera,92 for instance, Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion invoked "expressive harms" in explaining why the
usage of race as the predominant factor in drawing district lines rendered the plan subject to strict scrutiny.93 Dissenting in Vera, moreover, Justice Souter contended that the injury in Shaw "is probably
best understood as an 'expressive harm. "94
C. Reclaiming the Expressiveness Paradigm
Although the invocation of expressive harms has thus far worked
to prevent African Americans from gaining more political power, the
presidential nomination system illustrates how the Court's adoption of
an expressive harms approach could serve not to constrain black po-

87 Id.
88 Id. at 657.
89 Richard H.

Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483
('993).
90 Id. at5o6-o7.
91 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648.
92 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
93

Id. at 984.

94 Id. at 1053 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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95 Under an expressive harms approach,
litical power but to expand it.
the Court would reason that because Iowa and New Hampshire exert
disproportionate influence on the presidential nomination process, the
scheme communicates the idea that black voters are not as important
as white voters. If one were to envision the geographic landmass that
comprises the United States as one large district for the presidency, one
could view the national Democratic Party as essentially carving out
two overwhelmingly white sections to serve as the barometers of popular opinion. The expressive harms approach in the presidential nomination system, then, would address a harm reminiscent of that invalidated in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 96 in which Tuskegee, Alabama, redrew
its municipal boundaries in order to exclude all but a handful of black
voters. To be sure, the current presidential nomination system lacks
the animus that motivated Gomillion's redistricting. Despite this important distinction, however, the presidential nomination process - as
with the redrawing of municipal boundaries in Gomillion - communicates to many African Americans that they are not fully-valued
members of the political community. 97
Justice O'Connor's vote has often been determinative in equal protection cases over the last fifteen years, and there is no reason to believe that she would not play a similarly central role in a legal challenge to the current presidential nomination system. The infinitesimal
percentages of African Americans in Iowa and New Hampshire
threaten Justice O'Connor's commitment to "racial opacity."98 Justice
95 Cf.Jamin B. Raskin, Is This America?: The District of Columbia and the Right To Vote, 34
HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39, 65-70 (1999) (arguing that the denial of congressional representation
to citizens of Washington, D.C., constitutes an expressive harm).
96 364 U.S. 339 (ig6o).
97 Cf.DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE

PRIMARY IN TEXAS 235 (i979) ("To the black Texans the white primary symbolized their power-

lessness, their second-class citizenship, their caste-like position within the total society."). Regardless of whether one finds Justice O'Connor's "political apartheid" analogy in Shaw illuminating,
the expressive harms approach can be utilized meaningfully in the presidential nomination context. In Shaw, recognition of the expressive harm requires individuals to conceive of themselves
in unusual fashions; that is, Shaw perceives people (and groups of people) from the bird's-eye
view of an electoral map. The people most directly affected by the districting scheme in Shaw
(black voters along the 1-85 corridor) seem unlikely to have perceived the scheme as an injury. In
the presidential nomination context, however, black voters are quite likely to perceive Iowa's and
New Hampshire's primacy as an injury, because of their weak electoral voice.
98 Professor Issacharoff identifies "racial opacity" as "the heart of Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence," which he places between the commitment to "racial neutrality" that typifies the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas and the commitment
to "racial pluralism" that captures the approach of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contoursof Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 6365. "Unwilling to call a halt to all beneficial uses of racial classifications to remediate societal inequities," Issacharoff argues, "but also deeply troubled by the increasing evidence of racial factionalism, O'Connor demands primarily that the use of race not be excessive. Where race or racialism is visible to the casual eye, it is constitutionally infirm." Id. at 64. Justice O'Connor's
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O'Connor invalidated the appearance of the electoral district in Shaw,
it seems fair to conclude, because she thought that the district resembled the "uncouth," twenty-eight-sided Gomillion district. In both instances, race was a visible factor, and one could deduce that information merely by eyeballing the districts. To put the matter plainly, the
districts simply did not look right. Similarly, in the eyes of many black
voters, giving such disproportionate power to Iowa and New Hampshire just does not look right. Appearances matter not only when reapportioning districts, but also when nominating presidents. The extremely skewed racial composition of the most powerful states in the
presidential nomination contests could plausibly be perceived as yet
another voting structure that "threatens to carry us further from the
goal of a political system in which race no longer matters." 99 It would
be more than a bit odd were the Court to recognize expressive harms
in circumstances designed to improve black political participation (racially gerrymandered districts) while simultaneously ignoring expressive harms in an instance that constrains black political participation
(the presidential nomination system).100
Admittedly, the Court's recognition of an expressive harm in the
presidential nomination context would represent a departure from its
recent applications of that term. In Shaw and Vera, the Court found
expressive harms because it perceived the state as intentionally elevating race above all other concerns in drawing district boundaries. Intent thus poses a stumbling block in transferring the expressive harms
analysis to the presidential nomination context. An inability to demonstrate intent in the presidential nomination context is hardly fatal,
however, considering that intent is not required under section 2. Indeed, the statute was amended in 1982 specifically to circumvent the
seemingly insurmountable intent requirement imposed in City of Mobile v. Bolden. 10 Thus, a voting practice that results in underenfranchisement should trigger section 2 regardless of intent. The Court inquired whether race predominated under Shaw because the expressive
harm rose to the level of an equal protection violation; here, the underenfranchisement injury poses a section 2 statutory violation. Although

position on the University of Michigan affirmative action cases confirms Issacharoff's point. She
was willing to abide a pluralistic approach when race was used loosely at the law school, see
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), but not when there was a rigid numerical application
to the undergraduate program, see Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
99 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
100 It would not, however, be the first time that the Court failed to distinguish between efforts
to improve black political power and efforts to impede such power. Cf., e.g., Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw
II), 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A majority's attempt to enable the minority
to participate more effectively in the process of democratic government should not be viewed with
the same hostility that is appropriate for oppressive and exclusionary abuses of political power.").
101 446 U.S. 55 (i98o).
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the Court has thus far identified expressive harms only in cases arising
under the Constitution, there is no reason to believe that the Court
would resist importing that concept to section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. Given that the statute was designed to enforce the constitutional
protections afforded by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it
would be striking if the Court refused to take that modest step.
It is important to note, moreover, that a lack of explicit racial animus toward African Americans by the national Democratic Party (in
scheduling the calendar of nomination events) or by legislators from
Iowa and New Hampshire (in passing their statutes) does not indicate
that racial considerations played no role in establishing the presidential
nomination system. 10 2 Professor David Strauss has suggested a particularly helpful way to smoke out latent racial considerations by performing what he has dubbed the "reversing the groups" test, 10 3 which
might also be termed the "disparate regard" standard.1 04 Under this
standard, Strauss asks whether decisionmakers "would have made the
same decision" if the adverse effects of the decision fell on whites
05
rather than on blacks.'
Applying the disparate regard standard to the presidential nomination system, one might locate a subterranean racial discrepancy by
imagining whether the same level of deference would be accorded to
the initial nomination contests if, say, Louisiana held the first caucuses
and Mississippi held the first primary. It seems unlikely that presidential candidates and the media would continue to place such emphasis
on the initial contests if it meant according so much power to black
voters in those heavily African-American states. 10 6 The reason why
politicians, the media, and the electorate accord so much deference to
Iowa and New Hampshire could be because whiteness is viewed as
largely neutral and therefore capable of meaningful extrapolation.

102 Cf Karlan, supra note 72, at 174 ("Unlike the white suburban plaintiffs in Reynolds whose
voting strength was diluted because of where they lived, the political power of black citizens is
diluted because of who they are." (footnote omitted) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964))).
103 See David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
935, 956-65 (1989).
104 Thanks go to Professor Margo Schlanger for this phrasing of Strauss's concept.
10s Strauss, supra note lO3, at 957.
106 According to the 2ooo Census, Louisiana was 32.5% black and Mississippi was 36% black.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LOUISIANA: 200o: CENSUS 2000 PROFILE
2 (2002); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MISSISSIPPI: 2000: CENSUS 2000
PROFILE 2 (2002). Consequently, in a multi-candidate field for the Democratic nomination, having those deep Southern states vote first would permit a black candidate with meager white support to emerge as the prohibitive frontrunner if voters in Louisiana and Mississippi engaged in
racially polarized voting. The point here is not to suggest that Democratic voters would never
elect a black candidate as their presidential nominee, only that they would be unlikely to do so for
a candidate who garnered little cross-racial support.
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The harm, then, is not the stigmatization of blackness, but the naturalization of whiteness. This perspective, though admittedly a good
deal more palatable than the nakedly anti-Negro ideology that dominated the politics of yesteryear, nonetheless stems from unfortunate racial considerations - a problem revealed by counterfactually substituting Louisiana and Mississippi for Iowa and New Hampshire. The
question, then, is not whether to be color-conscious about the presidential nomination system, but rather how to be color-conscious. 107
Applying black underenfranchisement as an expressive harm supports a view of the presidential nomination system as a betrayal of the
"civic inclusion" model of democratic participation. 10 8 The system
prevents African Americans from feeling included because the process
seems to elevate the status of white voters, thereby resulting in an unequal distribution of political dignity. 10 9 African Americans consistently and overwhelmingly support the Democratic nominee for President; 110 at the very least, they should be afforded the opportunity to
voice an opinion about who that nominee will be.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that Iowa's and New Hampshire's primacy
in the presidential nomination process could be challenged under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as the process underenfranchises black
voters. As is often the case, the presence of racial inequities highlights
more fundamental problems within political and social structures."'
107 See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 114 ("[W~e do not
have a choice between colorblindness and race-consciousness; we only have a choice between different forms of race-consciousness.").
108 Professor Pamela Karlan explains that the civic inclusion model offers a range of benefits:
"a sense of connectedness to the community and of equal political dignity; greater readiness to
acquiesce in governmental decisions and hence broader consent and legitimacy; and more informed, equitable and intelligent governmental decisionmaking." Karlan, supra note 72, at 18o;
see also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (i958) ("Of course I know how illusory
would be the belief that my vote determined anything; but nevertheless when I go to the polls I
have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture.").

109 See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE

CONSTITUTION 94 (1989) ("Voting is the preeminent symbol of participation in the society as a
respected member, and equality in the voting process is a crucial affirmation of the equal worth of
citizens."); cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) ("One of the principal reasons race is
treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be
judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.").
110 But see Lynette Clemetson, Younger Blacks Tell Democrats To Take Notice, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2003, at Ax (describing how black voters have become increasingly disenchanted with the
Democratic Party); JoAnn Wypijewski, Black and Bruised, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. I, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 20.
III See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 12 (2002) ("Racialized communities signal

problems with the ways we have structured power and privilege.").
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African Americans are the group most visibly disadvantaged by the
presidential nomination scheme, but the scheme ought to concern citizens of any color who are residents of neither Iowa nor New Hampshire. The citizens of those two states exert influence on the method of
selecting presidential nominees in ways that contravene the equipopulation principle underlying the "one person, one vote" ideal. As Chief
Justice Warren wrote in Reynolds v. Sims, 1 12 "[w]eighting the votes of
citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because of where
they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable."' 13 It is not at all clear
that Warren's dictum - which became the basis of the "one person,
one vote" principle - was meant to apply exclusively to state or local
elections. Indeed, it would be odd if the Court meant to exempt (even
at the nomination stage) the country's sole nationwide election from
this foundational principle. 114 Although some commentators argue
that white suburbanites have wielded the equipopulation principle to
commandeer voting rights protections intended to protect African
Americans, 115 in the presidential nomination context the interests of
black voters and the "one person, one vote" ideology converge.
The current presidential nomination system reveals an anemic conception of democratic participation," 6 as the input of a minuscule slice
of the electorate exerts a profound impact on determining the eventual
nominees. Although this Note contemplates the possibility of judicial
intervention, it must be conceded that the prospect of Court action is
inextricably connected to the popular will." 7 Just as the unrest of ordinary citizens spurred the initial reforms of the presidential nomination system in the I96os, the public must once again express discontent
to ensure that popular will plays a meaningful role in selecting presidential nominees.

112 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
113 Id. at 563.
114 Cf.Anderson v. Celebrezze, 46o U.S. 780, 795 (1983) (noting that "the President and the Vice

President of the United States are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation").
115 See, e.g., James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile
v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. i, 4 (1982) (arguing that the constitutionalization of the equipopulation principle has overshadowed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment protections for black voters and thus "has
created an intolerable inversion of historical and constitutional priorities").
116 For an argument that courts ought to be alert to and remove such restraints on the political
energy of ordinary people, see RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE
CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994).

RULE": A

117 See Armand Derfner, Racial Discriminationand the Right To Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523,
583-84 (973) ("The right to vote cannot be protected or advanced solely in the courts; notwithstanding recent judicial history, courts traditionally trail, not lead, democratic advances. In the
last analysis, the equal right to vote will be protected only if our nation believes in it.").

